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 Summary 
This dissertation aims to study the time consistency problem of monetary policy 
in two-country model. We raise two research questions: 1) Is the Friedman rule 
less likely to be sustained under cooperation than under non-cooperation when 
the governments lack commitment technology? 2) Is delegation more effective 
to solve the time consistency when the economy becomes more open?  
Chapter 1 describes the motivation, research objectives, methodology, and 
organization.  
Chapter 2 investigates the time-consistency problem of monetary policy under 
open economy. We first consider the consequences and the solutions in the 
general macroeconomic framework, and then examine the role of open 
economy in solving the time-inconsistent monetary policies. Three main 
consequences have been pointed out in the literature: inflationary bias, 
expectation trap, and free rider. To eliminate the problem, different types of 
commitment technologies have been suggested: rules, reputation, maturity 
structures of public debt, and monetary delegation method. An open economy 
sheds more light on resolving the problem.  
Chapter 3 uses a microfounded New Keynesian two-country model to revisit 
the counterproductive cooperation when governments cannot commit to their 
future monetary policy. When monopolistic distortions are large, the optimal 
policy under commitment is characterized by the global Friedman rule 
irrespective of policy regime. The counterproductive cooperation between 
governments displays in two aspects: under cooperation, the discretionary 
outcome may be worse, and the global Friedman rule is less likely to be 
sustained than under non-cooperation.  
Chapter 4 assesses the effects of openness on the effectiveness of delegation in 
solving the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy. We built a micro-
founded New Keynesian two-country model with a government structure 
including a government and a central bank. We explicitly formulate delegation 
process which allows the government to reappoint the current central bank with 
a reappointment cost. Our findings are two-fold: when the economy becomes 
more open, a lower threshold of reappointment cost parameter is required for 
central bank appointment being sustained and when the reappointment cost is 
less than such a threshold, the current central bank is less likely to be 
reappointed.  
Chapter 5 provides conclusions and policy implications.  
